The specifications are presented for an imperfect automatic test system (ATS) (test frequency distribution, reliability, false alarm rate, nondetection rate) in order to account for the availability, readiness, mean time between unscheduled repairs (MTBUR), reliability, and maintenance of the system subject to monitoring and test. A time-dependent Markov model is presented, and applied in three cases, with examples of numerical results provided for preventive maintenance decisions, design of an automatic test system, buffer testing in computers, and data communications.
requires a well-balanced tradeoff between UUT reliability, ATS reliability, and the test strategy.
In terms of a sensitivity analysis, it is now especially dangerous to disregard the ATS reliability, when evaluating the system availability. The issues addressed are all related to the effects of an imperfect test system on the availability of the system under test, with its associated on-line monitoring and test system (ATS). The testing of the system/UUT is assumed to be a random checkout policy with a known probability distribution. The main imperfections accounted for are: 1) UUT reliability, 2) test system reliability, 3) false alarm rate of the test system, 4) nondetection rate of the test system, and 5) losses affecting the transmission of the alarms.
Moreover, independent of the technique used for failure diagnosis or detection, it is essential to investigate the effects of the maintenance and removal policies on this same system availability, in the presence of an imperfect monitoring and test system. Maintenance may in this context be restricted to repair, or to simple error correction, and the duration is characterized by a known probability distribution. The four classes of maintenance actions considered here are 1) on-site (or fast) repair after a failure has been detected by the test system, 2) off-site (or slow) repair after a failure has been detected by the test system, 3) withdrawal of UUT from service because of replacement, and 4) pulling down UUT for possible test after removal.
Finally, after unscheduled maintenance, repair, or error correction, which are here assumed to be without defects, the systems may be stored on-site or off-site. The same happens in case of withdrawal from service. The storage time distributions are supposed to be known. Preventive maintenance is carried out after a fixed duration (or number of cycles) T, also called life length.
No single general model is known to take into account the imperfections of the test and monitoring system. Only inspection errors in quality control have been considered [10] , although a number of works have been dealing with models of preventive maintenance and IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AEROSPACE AND ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS VOL. AES-23, NO. 5 SEPTEMBER 1987 system reliability [2, 5, 8, 15] , or failure detection and diagnosis [13, 14] and automatic test systems [9] .
The model proposed here is of wide applicability in terms of on-line test and monitoring systems, with obviously different orders of magnitude for all parameters involved: avionics [1, 11] , telecommunications, control systems, manufacturing lines, computer systems, and integrated circuits [16] . Should the restrictions used here to deal with the time-dependent Markov model of a single-unit repairable system not hold, or should the online monitoring and testing not be random, there is literature to cover such specific extensions.
II. OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES
These procedures are schematized in Fig. 1 . We define rl as the probability of detecting correctly the system failure with an operating ATS, r2 as the probability of assigning a faulty UUT to off-site repair, rather than on-site repair, r3 as the probability of putting back into operational storage (condition E7) a system which was just pulled-down incorrectly, rather than testing it (condition El), and r4 as the probability that the ATS identifies correctly the UUT as being operational.
A. System Or Unit Under Test (UUT)
The system is assumed to operate according to specifications until one of the following circumstances happens:
1) The system undergoes a test or check-out (without removal), which is performed with an automatic test and monitoring system (ATS). During this test the UUT does not operate according to specifications and the test sequences are randomly distributed over time with a rate tl (t).
2) The system is improperly pulled down for accessability considerations due to other equipments; it is not left in pulled-down position (no holding time), and either tested by the ATS or assigned to on-site storage in a random way.
3) The system is withdrawn from service because of replacement, or of aging, and goes to off-site storage without test.
Finally, the UUT is assumed to operate correctly again after the end of the test sequence, assuming that no failure has been detected.
B. Test And Monitoring System (ATS)
1) The test and monitoring system tests the UUT, while it operates, at the rate fiol(t), and tests also the UUT when it has been improperly pulled down. operating correctly, and the operating ATS has detected a failure (false alarm), or the UUT has a failure, and the ATS has detected it, although there is a nondetection probability; the UUT has the reliability function F(t). The two cases in 3)b) above are illustrated by the decision table for the ATS detection system, which relates the detected UUT condition with its true condition, in which (see Fig. 2 Also, we assume that the repair times are exponential, the inter-test times are Markovian, and all event types are mutually independent.
Should some specific applications not match these restrictive assumptions, a number of generalizations to more complex reliability problems can be found in the literature [17, 18, 19] .
I11. MODEL
To describe the process outlined in Section II, we propose a continuous time Markov model, with timedependent coefficients and transition rates (see [4, 6] ).
State Probabilities (see Fig. 1 ): Let pi(t) be the probability for the system (ATS and UUT) to be in one of the following eight states: EO: System 
A. Exogeneous Probabilities
Due to reliability considerations, or in connection with the maintenance organization, the following probabilities are defined:
One can then compute the probability y(t) for the test and monitoring unit to deliver an alarm, based on the outcomes listed in Section IIB: y(t) = Pr(ATS output = alarm at time t)
(1) (2) where the second factor is the combined transition rate from El to E4 or E15.
B. State Evolutions
The evolutions of the state probabilities pi(t) are governed by the equations (see Fig. 1 (3) dit [-4lo (t) + (1 -rr2(t) L14 + r2y(t)p15]p1 (t) + po 1 (t)po(t) + (1 -r3)p.03p3(t) (4) dtp1 1
(8)
( 1 1 This lack of strong global ergodicity is essentially due to the imperfections of the test equipment, and to I102 # 0.
Ergodicity, as well as singularity conditions, are of secondary importance here, because we are only interested in finite horizon numerical solutions; this finite horizon is equal to the preventive maintenance period T.
One may easily compute, if needed, the ergodic coefficient of the stochastic process, and follow its time variations, and especially its convergence towards zero, in case of weak ergodicity ([61). 
IV. APPLICATION A. PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE DECISIONS A. Criteria Applying To Preventive Maintenance
One of the following maintenance decision rules can be considered [5] : 1) Overhaul or replace the system if it is found to be in a state of deterioration exceeding a control limit.
2) Minimize the cost per service time unit, when the cost of replacement or overhaul and the costs of being in the various degraded states are taken into account (including inspection costs).
3) Maximize the time between replacements or overhauls subject to the assumption that the reliability does not exceed some upper limit. 4 
MTBUR(T) MTBUR (t+ T) (16
The probability r2 becomes the ratio of the probability of the decision E5, to the probability of the decision E4, as reflected by the values of p5(t) and p4(t). Numerical solutions may be obtained by forward integration, for specified values of ,0ol(t), ji02(t), F(t), and G(t). 
On-site repair p4 (t) 0.1 0.144 On-site storage p7(t) 0.1 0.0135 Off-site repair p5 (t) 0.! 0.0649 Off-site storage p6(t) 0.1 0.0103
Whereas most state probabilities have monotonous evolutions (po decreasing; P3,P4,P5,P6,P7 -increasing), it is extremely interesting to observe that the testing probability Pi (t) peaks at an intermediate stage (t = 37), and remains around Pi = 0,06 until t= T. The replacement probability peaks also, and remains level thereafter.
C. Sensitivity Analysis
This analysis is restricted here to single perturbations with respect to the standard case of Section V B, and the main results are displayed in Table IL . Complete timedependent plots are not possible here for lack of space. For low ATS reliability, the testing probability Pi (t) may have several oscillations. This also occurs if the testing rate pt (t) is high and close to 1, where instabilities occur.
D. Specification Of Recalibration Intervals
The model of Section II is also appropriate if the test system is not resident close to the UUT, and represents a calibration system. The issue is here to optimize the rate tol(t) at which recalibration is carried out, with the alarms corresponding to measurements out of specifications, or to drift.
E. Partial Conclusion
It is necessary to carry out an exhaustive sensitivity analysis about the extreme values of the availability po(t), versus the ATS specification parameters of Section V A, 
B. Buffer Model
As a single approximation to the buffer space, we consider a single MIMI 1 -N queue with Poisson (1) arrival process, and independent identically distributed (IID) (m) service process. If qk, k -0, ..., N is the total number of packets in the buffer number k, the steadystate distribution is = pk(l -p)/(l -pN+2) p A 1/m. (17) The mean number of packets in the buffer is: N+ 1 N , kqk (18) k=G and the mean waiting time is: W= T-(1/rm) (19) where T is the mean time spent in the buffer. The following formula are found in the steady-state case:
The blocking probability, that is the probability that a packet arrives to a full buffer, after which it is lost, is
In the time-dependent case, the equations for the process are, for an arrival process Poisson (LT) dqo = -LTqo + m q1 -I t LT(t) = PO(t) (26) which depends on the states of the UUT and of the ATS.
The measurement of LT(t) is the subject of [7] . The original arrival process is Poisson (L).
An alarm may now be initiated by the test system if there is a loss of information, that is, if some packets are lost. This supplements the other failure modes related to errors in the packets, or to the hardware of the UUT or ATS (see Section 11B3). As a consequence, the probability of alarm y(t) must incorporate the blocking probability for the N-buffer:
(27) YN(t) = '(t) + qN+ 1 (t).
Thus, the buffer condition will directly affect the test system depending on the traffic load, when YN replaces y in the equations of Section III A.
D. Numerical Example
Because of numerical instability, the integration step for the joint system of differential systems of Sections IIIB and VIB must be reduced to At/10. The numerical results (Table III) indicate rather high "maximum alarm rates" due to the values of XT and rj.
E. Partial Conclusion
The error-detection and error-correction schemes selected, with corresponding resulting alarm rates, must be adapted to buffer size and to the traffic arrival process.
VIl. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a time-dependent Markov model describing jointly a system subject to random testing, and its associated test and monitoring system. The emphasis is on the imperfections of the test system, such as reliability, false alarm, and nondetection rate, and on their implications on the overall system availability, readiness and maintenance. It is shown through examples that the testing probability as well as the alarm rate, exhibit time-dependent oscillations, the extremes of which must be known. Tradeoffs must also be made between the system and test system reliabilities.
Application A deals with the application of the model to preventive maintenance decisions. Application B is a numerical analysis of the specification and design of a testing system. Application C covers buffer testing in computers and data communications. Here the operational state is itself subdivided, and the alarm rate is triggered also by the loss of information entering the buffer.
The main conclusions of this study are the following. 1) It is now possible to specify the ATS reliability in view of the UUT reliability and system availability, for given ATS failure detection performances.
2) It is necessary to take into account time-dependent evolutions of a number of test parameters in order to guarantee worst-case designs.
3) It is now possible to relate directly the test probability in self-testing systems to the overall system availability.
